While on the campaign trail and in his presidential trade policy announcements since, Donald Trump has promised to lower the U.S. trade deficit with the goal of rebuilding American manufacturing.
With trade and manufacturing data now available for the first six months of Trump’s second term, we can begin to see how his policies are affecting key trade and manufacturing indicators and measure outcomes against his April 2 prediction that “jobs and factories will come roaring back into our country.”
The six month 2025 trade data show a significant increase in the U.S. trade deficit compared to the first six months of 2024—or to the last six months of 2024. Measures of manufacturing activity also show across-the-board declines.
This page will be updated quarterly. This data will provide a look at the most important manufacturing indicators and trade data—including the manufactured goods trade balance—to measure real outcomes against the Trump administration’s promises.
Two trends we will carefully track for 2025 Q3: After a huge jump in the trade deficit in Q1 of Trump’s second term, in Q2 imports fell back to 2024 levels and in some instances dropped further, especially in June. But, despite this, every manufacturing indicator that we reviewed showed declines.
Manufacturing employment declined to 12,738,000 employees in June 2025, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. This count is down 22,000 from the December 2024 count of 12,760,000 employees, and down 101,000 from 12,839,000 American manufacturing employees in June 2024. Manufacturing employment rose slightly from 12,755,000 in January 2025 to 12,764,000 employees in April 2025, and then fell in May and June 2025 to the current level.
The decline in the U.S. Census Bureau’s “Manufacturers’ Shipments, Inventories, and Orders” data, specifically the “American Manufacturers’ New Orders for Nondefense Capital Goods (Excluding Aircraft)” data, is considered an indicator of slowing manufacturing activity. This data cut captures both equipment and inputs/supply chain purchases. After a slight quarter-over-quarter increase from Q4 2024 to Q1 2025, these capital goods orders fell to $223.9 billion in Q2 2025, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Capital goods orders in the first half of 2025 were $449.8 billion. Adjusted for inflation, this is down from $502.9 billion in the first half of 2022, $470.7 billion in the first half of 2023, and $450.2 billion in the first half of 2024.
The U.S. manufacturing PMI has been steadily declining. A PMI above 50 points indicates the manufacturing economy is expanding while a PMI below 50 points indicates the manufacturing economy is declining. The index reached 50.9 points in February of this year, fell to 50.3 points in March, and declined further in April, May, and June 2025, according to Investing.com. Prior to 2025, the index was most recently over 50 points in April 2024.
Manufactured goods imports increased significantly in the first quarter of 2025, reaching a monthly total of over $300 billion for the first time in March 2025 (inflation-adjusted), according to the U.S. Census Bureau. In the second quarter of 2025, manufactured goods imports were $707.9 billion. The six-month 2025 manufactured goods trade deficit is nearly 24% higher than the same six months in 2024.
The trade gap has widened significantly as imports jumped in January, February, and March, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Imports in Q1 2025 were $197.8 billion higher than in Q1 2024 (inflation-adjusted), while exports were only $13.5 billion higher in Q1 2025 than in Q1 2024. Q2 2025 imports were $7.6 billion lower than Q2 2024 (inflation-adjusted) and $187.3 billion lower than Q1 2025. In contrast, Q2 2025 exports were $26.9 billion higher than Q2 2024 and $10.8 billion higher than Q1 2025. Imports fell from over $400 billion in March 2025 to $347 billion in April and May and $333 billion in June. Q2 data indicates that the new tariff policy is starting to reduce import levels and the Q3 figures will be key to understand the trend of trade patterns under Trump’s tariff policy.
The U.S. goods and services trade deficit widened due to increased imports in January, February, and March 2025. Following the March high of over $400 billion, imports fell to $333 billion in June 2025.
As has been the trend since 2019, the decline in imports from China is being swamped by growing imports from other countries, which lead to an overall larger U.S. trade deficit. Chinese investment in countries like Vietnam and Mexico has created a workaround with Chinese firms able to reach U.S. markets and benefit from the trade terms these countries have with the United States. In the second quarter of 2025, imports from Canada, China, and Ireland fell significantly compared to the first quarter of 2025; imports from Mexico, Taiwan, and ASEAN countries increased.
After peaking at $726.4 billion (adjusted for inflation) in Q3 2024, U.S. construction spending in manufacturing declined to $686.3 billion in Q1 2025 and $673.6 billion in Q2 2025, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Construction spending skyrocketed in 2022 and 2023 after the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act was signed into law in November 2021 and the Chips and Science Act and Inflation Reduction Act were signed into law in August 2022. Quarterly construction spending in manufacturing increased by nearly $402 billion from Q4 2021 to Q4 2024. Spending on manufacturing construction, which includes new factories and expanding or updating existing facilities, is now stagnating.
No administration can quickly turn around decades of U.S. trade deficits and deindustrialization. But it is notable that every manufacturing indicator shows worsening outcomes. Additionally, the 2025 trade deficit so far is higher than the 2024 figure. While, since April 2025, imports have declined likely due to the tariffs imposed by the Trump administration, the lack of certainty and stability that have characterized them are likely having a chilling effect on manufacturing activity and investment. And, to date, the trade “agreements” the administration has announced do not include terms designed to change the underlying causes of surging imports from the countries that are the main source of the structural imbalance. Very little detail is available—perhaps very little is agreed—for the various deals that have been announced thus far. But at a high level, these deals do not meet the criteria that would be beneficial in addressing the U.S. trade deficit and deindustrialization.